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Abstract 
The somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) is one of the more dominant 
physiological models of human decision making and yet is seldom 
applied to decision making in financial investment scenarios. This study 
provides preliminary evidence about the application of the SMH in 
investment choices using heart rate (HR) and skin conductance response 
(SCRs) measures. Twenty undergraduate students were split equally into 
expert (defined by familiarity with investments) and novice (no 
familiarity) groups - previous research has associated expertise with 
cognitive differences in decision making scenarios. Both completed the 
BART and BIAS - a computerized simulation of real trading scenarios - 
tasks as assessments of investment decision making in conditions of low 
vs high uncertainty, as defined by the Bayesian Calculation (level of 
certainty is more than:(1 – (–300%)) / ((300% – (–300%)) = 66.67% 
(0.67). Results suggest that, whilst primary inducers (innate 
physiological responses) support and guide optimal decision making in 
conditions of uncertainty, secondary inducers (physiological responses 
dependent on memory/experience) moderate this effect i.e. the stressful 
thoughts that accompany the task restrict optimal decision making. This 
study contributes to the current knowledge on why emotions in finance 
can lead people to suboptimal decisions. 
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Introduction 
The relationship between somatic markers and emotions has been 
empirically illustrated by Damasio, Everitt and Bishop (1996), who 
developed the SMH. The SMH proposes that when we experience an 
emotion, before we can consciously process it, our brain triggers somatic 
markers, such as a raised heart rate (HR) and skin conductance response 
(SCR), that guide our choices under uncertainty (A. Bechara & Damasio, 
2005). The model is said to have an evolutionary foundation (Bechara & 
Damasio, 2005) and, by guiding us towards optimal decisions when we 
are uncertain, has played a role in the survival of our species; helping us 
to anticipate reward and punishment, for example (A Bechara, Damasio, 
Tranel, & Damasio, 1997). The role of physiology in decision making is 
represented at neural levels also, with fMRI research finding that specific 
brain areas are associated with risk-seeking (nucleus accumbens) or risk-
averse (anterior insula) behaviour (Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005), and thus 
suggests that physiological and neural actions support us in optimal 
decision making. In terms of financial scenarios, somatic markers may 
facilitate optimal economic decisions that have the greatest financial 
reward. For example, SCRs guide typically developing individuals 
towards optimal financial rewards (Zink, Pagnoni, Martin-Skurski, 
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Chappelow, & Berns, 2004). Given that SCR and anterior insula 
responses are associated with both decision making and emotional 
processes, it suggests the presence of an emotional component within 
decision making. This emotional component might enhance or diminish 
the level of arousal and thus guide people towards optimal or suboptimal 
(too risk-seeking or too risk-averse) choice making. This is the essence of 
the SMH.  
 
The SMH posits that somatic markers can be triggered by two types of 
inducers: “primary” and “secondary” (Bechara, Dolan, & Hindes, 2002). 
Primary inducers are innate; such as physiological arousal related to 
pleasure or aversive reactions. For example, when people make 
investment decisions, primary inducers are triggered as an innate reaction 
to market news. This contrasts with secondary inducers, triggered by the 
recall of emotional events, which then trigger reflective and considered, 
rather than impulsive (Loomes & Sugden, 1982), investment responses 
(Bechara & Damasio, 2005). This component of the SMH is similar to 
Affect Heuristic Theory in that it highlights the role of affective 
processes in decision making (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 
2007), and it may be that these affective responses facilitate optimal 
choice-making – particularly in conditions of high uncertainty.  
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This secondary inducer response is developed by the Appraisal-Tendency 
Framework (ATF) (Jennifer S Lerner & Kelter, 2000), which captures 
the importance of emotions in decision making – that is subjective 
experiences that are relevant to present judgments (Han, Lerner, & 
Keltner, 2006). For example, Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 
(2003) found that experimentally induced fear of terrorism significantly 
increased risk estimation regarding likelihood of further attacks. In 
essence, the ATF proposes that decisions are influenced more by 
secondary inducers (our feelings and evaluations during the decision 
making process e.g. at the prospect of facing the complexity) rather than 
primary inducers (our innate and initial emotional and physiological 
responses) (Loewenstein, Hsee, Weber, & Welch, 2001). However, the 
ATF fails to acknowledge the role of primary inducers and their related 
physiological changes (which we know occur) and thus the SMH may be 
a more comprehensive explanation of the relationship between arousal 
and decision making.  
 
There are however concerns about the internal validity of the SMH. 
Colombetti (2008) comments that the broad characterisation of somatic 
markers and the dimensional nature of arousal restricts the extent to 
which we can tease primary and secondary inducers apart from arousal 
responses, such as changes in SCRs that are unrelated to the decision 
making process e.g. appetitive response (Amiez, Procyk, Honoré, 
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Sequeira, & Joseph, 2003). Whilst this might be true, we know that the 
SMH is fundamental in explaining economic decisions, and therefore 
should be used as theoretical background for research in neuroeconomics 
(Bechara & Damasio, 2005). To this end, the present study aims to 
extend and apply the SMH to investment choice-making. 
 
Moving away from critique of the model itself, there have also been 
questions raised about how the SMH is investigated, and the 
methodology of previous experiments (e.g. Bechara & Damasio, 2005); 
particularly concerning its generalisability to complex investment 
scenarios. For example, the suggested Iowa gambling task does not 
account for important characteristics related to the investment context.  
These include: the level of uncertainty, the possibility to learn from 
experience, the reverse learning process and updating beliefs observation 
after observation. This possibility to learn from experience may not be 
available in investment scenarios, and thus the ecological validity of the 
Iowa Gambling Task may be limited here (Buelow & Suhr, 2009).  
 
In response, the present study moves away from the norm (the Iowa 
gambling task) and instead uses the Behavioural Investment Allocation 
Strategy (BIAS) as an assessment of decision making. The BIAS task is 
more appropriate for use in the present study because it operationalizes 
(sub) optimal choice as a choice strictly dependent from the level of 
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uncertainty. A risk neutral agent should maximize his profit based on the 
level of uncertainty he faces. For example, if the level of uncertainty is 
high (in this study more than 0.67) a risk neutral agent makes an optimal 
choice if he chooses a bond rather than a stock. On the contrary, if the 
level of uncertainty is low (in this study less than 0.67) a risk neutral 
agent makes an optimal choice if he chooses a stock over a bond.  Other 
gambling tasks (such as the Iowa Gambling Task) define optimal choice 
as advantageous (Buelow & Suhr. 2009) but, by using the Bayesian rule 
of updating belief under uncertainty, the BIAS task gives a more 
sophisticated representation of what it means to choose advantageously. 
Furthermore, the BIAS task introduces language like “stock” and “bond”, 
which is investment-style language, and hence it has more ecological 
validity. Thirdly, unlike the Iowa Gambling Task, the BIAS task 
facilitates the measurement of anticipatory, as well as concurrent, 
physiological responses. This allows for more substantial conclusions 
about the impact of emotion (arousal) on decision-making.  
 
Investment-making requires a degree of expertise. As demonstrated by 
Perkins and Reyna (1990), expertise and experience reduce preference 
and typicality in decision making, meaning that those who are more 
experienced tend to make more incisive and meaningful decisions, rather 
than novices who tend to default toward normative or biased judgements. 
Furthermore, experts tend to have superior cognitive functioning and 
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perform better on tasks related to attention and problem solving 
(Shanteau, 1988); and find solutions faster and in less steps (Larkin, 
McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980) than non-experts. To acknowledge 
and investigate this difference in expertise and how it affects decision 
making, this research compares those with financial expertise to novices. 
Experts and non-experts also completed the Balloon Analogue Risk Task 
(BART) to account for any baseline differences in decision making style 
or propensities.  
 
In order to give an empirical contribution about the validity and 
reliability of the SMH in investment choices, the present preliminary 
study was conducted to investigate (1) whether or not low and high 
financial uncertainties function as “primary inducers” and produce a 
specific pattern of somatic markers that help individuals to decide 
optimally; (2) whether or not financial knowledge has an effect on 
somatic markers. 
The present study hypothesizes that (1) level of uncertainty will have an 
effect on state of arousal and subsequent decision making (2) that 
financial knowledge will help individuals to make more optimal 
decisions.  
 
Method 
Participants 
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The experiment involved twenty participants divided into two groups. 
The control group consisted of 10 students with mixed background 
(SMB) (Mage = 26.30, SD= 2.11) recruited from different departments at 
the University of Reading; the experimental group consisted of 10 
students specializing in finance (SSF) (Mage = 24.90, SD= 3.72) that 
took and completed at least one graduate course in finance, economics or 
business. SSF were recruited from the Henley Business School and the 
International Capital Market Association Centre (ICMA) at the 
University of Reading. Participants received £5 each for taking part in 
the experiment and the opportunity to win up to £20 depending on the 
points collected in the BIAS task (Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005). The study 
has received favorable consent by the Ethical Committee of the School of 
Psychology and Language Science (University of Reading). 
 
Materials  
The BART Task 
The main aim of the BART is to assess participants’ personal attitude 
towards risk (Lejuez et al., 2002). However, this definition might be 
controversial and lead to misinterpretation. Precisely, in a financial 
context the term “risk” is generally used when the probabilities of the 
various outcomes are known. On the other hand, when probabilities are 
unknown, the situation is ambiguous and not risky. Hence, since the 
BART task, as used in this context, does not inform the participants 
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about the probabilities that each balloon has to explode, it follows that in 
the present study the BART task was used to assess differences between 
groups in their attitude towards ambiguity and uncertainty. Participants 
were asked to inflate (through a keyboard press) thirty balloons with 
different probabilities of exploding. They earned 10 points per pump 
every time they inflated a balloon without popping it and 0 points if the 
balloon exploded.  
 
 The BIAS task 
The BIAS task represents a computerized simulation of the real trading 
scenario. In this version of the BIAS task participants completed a total 
of 180 investment decisions, broken down into 18 blocks of 10 trials 
each. Each trial involved choosing between a bond (represented by a 
circle with 100% probability of winning £1) and two stocks (represented 
by a triangle and a square). At the beginning of each block, the computer 
randomly assigned the triangle and square as either a good stock (50% 
+£10, 30% £0, and 20% –£10) or a bad stock (50% –£10, 30% £0, 20% 
+£10). Furthermore, each participant was informed of the above 
probabilities at the beginning of the task. 
The aim of the task was for participants to earn as much money as they 
could by discovering and betting on the good stock in each block. For 
each trial, the objective probability and level of uncertainty were 
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computed using Bayesian rule in order to calculate optimal and 
suboptimal choices (risk-seeking and risk-averse behavior). 
A correct answer (or optimal choice) occurs when: 1) if the level of 
uncertainty on triali is > 0.67 and the participants chose a bond 
(otherwise he/she commits a RSM); 2) if the level of uncertainty on triali 
is < 0.67 and the participants chose the good stock (otherwise he/she 
commits a RAM). A confusion mistake occurs if the level of uncertainty 
on triali is < 0.67 and the participants chose the bad stock instead of the 
good stock, because they “confound” the good stock with the bad stock. 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of a trial of the Behavioral Investment Allocation 
Strategy task. 
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Bayesian certainty calculation 
Every time a participant made a choice, it provided them with additional 
information to assess which stock was the good one in the current block. 
The Bayesian model is used here as a model of reference, to compare 
participants’ choices to those of a risk neutral agent.  By means of the 
Bayesian rule, we calculated the level of certainty for each trial. During 
trial t in each block, a risk neutral agent should pick a stock only if he/she 
has enough information and so the level of certainty is more than: 
(1 – (–300%)) / ((300% – (–300%)) = 66.67% (0.67). Risk-averse 
participants may not pick a stock even if they have more information that 
this (i.e. a higher level of certainty). Whereas, risk-seeking participants 
may select the stock even if the level of certainty does not meet this.  
 
Electrophysiological recordings 
During the BIAS task, HR and SCR signals were simultaneously 
recorded using a data acquisition system (Power Lab model ML-856, 
ADInstruments, Colorado Springs, USA) and software programme 
(LabChart 7.0; ADInstruments). 
 
SCR was recorded using two 15 x 20 mm contact area MLT116F GSR 
finger electrodes attached to the distal phalanges of the index and middle 
finger on the non-dominant hand. The raw signal was sampled at 1 kHz 
and digitized with 50 kbits/s precision. The data were selected and 
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filtered on a trial-by-trial basis. SCR refers to the amplitude of the 
response.  
 
HR was recorded using a 15 mm circular contact area MP100 Pulse 
transducer attached to the distal phalanges of the ring finger. A raw 
signal was sampled at 1 kHz and digitized with 24 bit precision. HR 
variability before and after choices was calculated by identifying R-
spikes using automated LabChart 7.0 algorithms. 
 
A resting HR was recorded for all participants over a period of 80s 
before the BIAS task to establish baseline levels and identify any 
intrinsic differences (task independent) in arousal between the two 
groups. HR was monitored 2s before and 2s after each choice. HR 
responses are typically characterized by an initial cardiac deceleration 
when the stimuli appear on the screen followed by a consequent 
acceleration from when the decision is taken to immediately after 
(Bradley, 2009).  Specifically, heart rate typically presents with a 
deceleration in anticipation of a stimulus followed by an acceleratory 
recovery to baseline (Jennings & Van Der Molen, 2002). Heart rate 
changes are a sensitive index of both anticipation and monitoring of the 
decision taken. In fact, the high temporal resolution of this measure 
enables the differentiation of these two different cognitive processes 
(Crone & Van Der Molen, 2007). Based on these previous studies we 
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mainly focused our analysis on the time windows in which the 
participants see the “anticipation” slide (preparation for action) in which 
we expect a deceleration and on the “wait” slide in which we expect an 
acceleration as preparation towards a feedback. 
 
Procedure  
Participants were individually invited to take part in a one-hour 
experiment in a physiological laboratory at the School of Psychology and 
Language Sciences, University of Reading. All participants read the 
information sheet and signed the consent form. At the beginning of the 
session, they performed the BART. The BART task was always 
conducted first as an assessment of individual differences in their 
propensity towards ambiguity and uncertainty, and thus only used to 
establish whether the groups were significantly different from one 
another in terms of their decision tendencies at baseline. Subsequently, 
they performed the modified version of the BIAS task (Kuhnen & 
Knutson, 2005) while skin conductance response and hearth rate were 
recorded. Participants received instructions of the BIAS task and they 
were aware of prior probabilities assigned respectively to the good and 
bad stock. 
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Data Analysis and Results 
 
Behavioral analysis 
BART task  
Correlation analysis showed that the number of balloon popping in the 
BART task strongly correlated with the number of RSM (suboptimal 
investment) in the BIAS task, r (18) = .48, p = .032. However, no 
differences were found between groups in the number of balloons popped 
in the BART task t (18) = .18, p = .858. 
BIAS task  
A mixed 2 x 2 repeated ANOVA, where uncertainty (level of investment) 
as calculated by Bayesian rule (low versus high) was the within subject 
variable and group background (SMB versus SSF) was the between 
subject variable, was performed on the number of optimal (good stock 
chosen) and suboptimal choices (RAM, RSM, confusion mistakes) in the 
two groups.  
A significant main effect of uncertainty condition was found in the 2x2 
ANOVA (1, 18) = 12.74, p = .002 (Figure 2) .ד The 2x2 ANOVA also 
showed an interaction between background and uncertainty F (1, 18) = 
4.33, p = .05. Bonferroni corrected paired-sample comparisons showed 
that SSF made a lower number of optimal choices under high than low 
uncertainty t (9) = 3.96), p = .003, whereas SMB showed no difference in 
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the number of optimal choices under low and high uncertainty, t (9) = 
1.06, p = .316 (see Figure2ה).  
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Electrophysiological analysis and results 
Heart rate results  
Independent sample t-test showed no significant difference in resting HR 
response (80 seconds prior to start the BIAS task) between the two 
groups (SSF and SMB). 
 
A 2 x 2 mixed repeated measure ANOVA design was used for the 
statistical analysis. Uncertainty (low versus high) was the within subject 
variable, group background (SMB versus SSF) was the between subject 
variable, and HR response around the choices (2s before and 2s after the 
choices) as dependent variable.  
The analysis revealed a significant interaction between background and 
uncertainty, F (1, 18) = 6.78, p = .018. Planned paired-sample 
comparisons indicated that SSF had a significantly higher HR response 
during choices under high uncertainty, t (9) = 2.24, p = .05. This pattern 
was not found in the SMB group, who showed no differences in HR 
between choices under high and low uncertainty t (9) = 1.34, p = .21 
Figure 4 ז. 
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Moreover, given the small sample size used in the study, a non-
parametric test was also run on comparison between HR and SCR under 
high and low uncertainty within the group of SSF.  
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test indicates that HR under high uncertainty was 
significantly higher than HR under low uncertainty in SSF, Z = -1.98, p = 
0.047. Furthermore, Wilcoxon signed-ranks test indicates that SCR under 
high uncertainty was significantly higher than SCR under low 
uncertainty in SSF, Z = -2.13, p = 0.033. 
 
Skin Conductance Response results 
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A mixed 2 x 2 mixed repeated measure ANOVA design with uncertainty 
(low versus high) as within subject variable,  group background (SMB 
versus SSF) as between subject variable, and SCR (4s window prior to 
choice) during the BIAS task was the dependent variable.  
Analysis showed a significant interaction between background and 
uncertainty, F (1, 18) = 4.52, p = .04. Planned post-hoc paired sample 
comparisons indicated that SSF had a higher SCR preceding choices 
under high rather than low uncertainty, t (9) = 2.16, p = .059 (trend of 
significance) whereas the SMB did not, t (9) = .20, p = .85. 
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Finally, neither HR nor SCR differed in preceding RSM, RAM, and 
optimal choices. The only difference found was related to the level of 
uncertainty reported above. 
 
 
 
Discussion 
The aim of the study was to provide preliminary evidence regarding the 
application of the SMH in investment choices. Specifically, the study 
aimed to understand the role of somatic markers elicited by primary 
inducers (preceding choices in low and high uncertainty) or secondary 
inducers (emotions elicited by the task per se) in groups of students with 
different financial knowledge/expertise (SSF versus SMB). 
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Before describing and interpreting the results, it is worth noting that both 
groups under investigation – SSF and SMB - did not show any 
significant behavioral differences in their propensity toward uncertainty 
and ambiguity measured using the BART task.  This suggests that 
behavioral differences found in the BIAS task between SSF and SMB 
groups are unlikely to be driven by existing differences in propensity 
toward ambiguity and uncertainty , nor any arousal responses a product 
of the BART task but, rather, likely to be induced by somatic markers 
elicited by financial uncertainty (built in the BIAS). This gives support to 
the usefulness of the BIAS task within investment scenarios and 
highlights this as a method of testing for future research.  Similarly, in 
terms of arousal levels, the two groups showed no significant differences 
in resting heart rate prior to performing the BIAS task, which suggests 
that arousal differences between SSF and SMB during the BIAS were 
primarily modulated by the task.  
At the behavioral level, the SSF group made a lower number of optimal 
choices under high than low uncertainty compared to the SMB group; 
who showed no difference in the number of optimal choices under low 
and high uncertainty. 
Significant differences were found on arousal measures (HR and SCR) 
between SSF and SMB, depending on the level of uncertainty (low 
versus high) during investment choice-making.. This suggests that 
somatic markers and physiological arousal have an impact on decision 
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making, and that somatic markers respond differently in those with and 
without financial expertise.  
Despite their financial knowledge, SSF performed significantly worse 
than SMB under high financial uncertainty. This result would appear 
controversial if somatic markers were not recorded, but the difference in 
physiological activity between SSF and SMB gives an interesting input 
on data interpretation. Results showed significant interactions between 
both SCR and HR (under low and high uncertainty) and background 
(SSF versus SMB) during investment choices. In other words, both 
groups showed a pattern of behavior strictly related to their own 
physiological response, and congruent with the level of uncertainty. 
Specifically, high or low uncertainty functioned as primary inducers that 
elicited specific somatic markers for each level of uncertainty. According 
to the SMH, participants’ choices were preceded by unconscious 
physiological response that facilitated advantageous decision making in 
conditions of low uncertainty. 
However, under high uncertainty SSF did not perform optimally. This 
finding deserves particular attention. In fact, somatic markers that 
enabled SSF to distinguish between high and low financial uncertainties 
worked properly but the expected response was not seen at a behavioral 
level. One of the plausible reasons why SSF could not decide optimally 
under high uncertainty could be because of other somatic markers that 
were elicited by co-occurring secondary inducers (e.g. the demands of 
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the task). It seems that somatic markers elicited by secondary inducers 
maintained the level of arousal in SSF significantly higher than SMB 
throughout the whole task. In essence, SSF experienced emotions 
(probably elicited by the task) that disrupted their ability to maximize 
their profit.  
To expand on this, we speculate that the valence of the emotions 
experienced was negative (e.g., fear, stress, or anxiety) because of the 
aversive impact it had. The “dark side” of emotions in investment 
choices has been found to lead typical individuals to adopt more 
conservative strategies, and therefore to make decreased number of 
advantageous decisions (Shiv, Loewenstein, Bechara, Damasio, & 
Damasio, 2005). Moreover, not all negative emotions exert equal 
behavioral responses (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999); for example, fear 
may promote risk aversion (Lerner & Keltner, 2001), as well as anxiety 
(Maner et al., 2007). On the other hand, acute stress may promote 
increased risky behavior in the loss-domain and increased conservatism 
in the gain-domain (Porcelli & Delgado, 2009). In this context, 
physiological activity suggests that the task per se may have represented 
a source of arousal (secondary inducer) for SSF and this explains why 
they made a significantly lower number of optimal choices in conditions 
of high uncertainty. High levels of stress had disrupted their ability to 
perform optimal investment choices, even if they could distinguish 
between high and low uncertainty conditions.  
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According to Loewenstein and Lerner (2003), emotions that are 
experienced at the moment of choice activate a number of visceral 
factors that alter the direction of one’s behavior in a way that is contrary 
to one’s self-interest. At a sufficient level of intensity, visceral factors 
cause people to behave against their better judgments (Loewenstein & 
Lerner, 2003). Classic examples are drug addiction, gambling addiction, 
or sexual desire in which people are aware of the negative effect of the 
cravings, but cannot stop their behavior.  
An important contribution that this study gives to the SMH is that, during 
investment choices, somatic markers can be elicited by both primary and 
secondary inducers. Primary inducers have the adaptive role, and elicit 
somatic markers that guide individuals’ decisions under different levels 
of uncertainty. However, the “negative and stressful” thoughts that 
accompany the task also stimulate the secondary inducers. The present 
study suggests that secondary inducers may have a stronger impact on 
decision making (as observed in the SSF psychophysiological measures 
in comparison to their choice-making).  
Whilst the small sample does restrict the strength of these conclusions, 
like Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio (1997), this study can be 
used as preliminary evidence to support the SMH in investment choices. 
As a starting point, this study highlights the ways in which future 
research can investigate the SMH in investment decision making. 
However, these results must be replicated in larger samples.    
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To conclude, this research has shown, firstly, that despite the influence of 
financial knowledge on decision-making, as speculated by Maia and 
McClelland (2004), the impact of somatic markers is stronger in guiding 
optimal decisions. Secondly, somatic markers do guide the decision-
making process in finance; especially, they enable individuals to 
understand when the situation implies high or low financial uncertainty. 
Thirdly, although the effect of somatic markers elicited by primary 
inducers might be beneficial, their positive impact can be suppressed by 
secondary inducers.  
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